Neural correlates of reward processing in schizophrenia — Relationship to apathy and depression by Simon, J J et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2010
Neural correlates of reward processing in schizophrenia — Relationship to
apathy and depression
Simon, J J; Biller, A; Walther, S; Roesch-Ely, D; Stippich, C; Weisbrod, M; Kaiser, S
Abstract: The present study employs a new framework to categorise the heterogeneous findings on the
relationship between impaired reward processing and negative and affective symptoms of schizophrenia.
Based on previous behavioural and neuroimaging studies we postulate that ”wanting” (i.e. anticipation)
of a reward is specifically related to apathy, whereas ”liking” (i.e. hedonic impact) is related to anhedonia
and depression–symptoms commonly observed in schizophrenia. Fifteen patients with schizophrenia or
schizoaffective disorder treated with atypical antipsychotic drugs and fifteen healthy controls performed
a probabilistic monetary incentive delay task while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging.
At the group level we found no significant differences between patients and controls in neural activation
during anticipation or receipt of a reward. However, in patients with schizophrenia specific relationships
between ventral-striatal activation and symptoms were observed. Ventral-striatal activation during re-
ward anticipation was negatively correlated with apathy, while activation during receipt of reward was
negatively correlated with severity of depressive symptoms. These results suggest that the link between
negative symptoms and reward anticipation might specifically relate to apathy, i.e. a lack of motiva-
tion and drive. Impaired hedonic reward processing might contribute to the development of depressive
symptoms in patients with schizophrenia, but it is not directly associated with self-rated anhedonia.
These results indicate the necessity of more specifically differentiating negative and affective symptoms
in schizophrenia in order to understand the role of the reward system in their pathogenesis.
DOI: 10.1016/j.schres.2009.11.007
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-43427
Originally published at:
Simon, J J; Biller, A; Walther, S; Roesch-Ely, D; Stippich, C; Weisbrod, M; Kaiser, S (2010). Neural
correlates of reward processing in schizophrenia — Relationship to apathy and depression. Schizophrenia
Research, 118(1-3):154-161. DOI: 10.1016/j.schres.2009.11.007
This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached
copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research
and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution
and sharing with colleagues.
Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or
licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party
websites are prohibited.
In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the
article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or
institutional repository. Authors requiring further information
regarding Elsevier’s archiving and manuscript policies are
encouraged to visit:
http://www.elsevier.com/copyright
Author's personal copy
Research Report
Neural correlates of evaluating hazards of high risk
Uwe Herwiga,⁎, 1, Annette B. Brühla, 1, Marie-Caroline Viebkea, Roland W. Scholzb,
Daria Knochc, Michael Siegristb
aPsychiatric University Hospital Zürich, Militärstr. 8, PF 1930, CH-8021 Zürich, Switzerland
bInstitute for Environmental Decisions, ETH, Zürich, Switzerland
cDepartment of Psychology, University of Basel, Switzerland
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Article history:
Accepted 12 May 2011
Available online 19 May 2011
In personal and in society related context, people often evaluate the risk of environmental
and technological hazards. Previous research addressing neuroscience of risk evaluation
assessed particularly the direct personal risk of presented stimuli, which may have
comprised for instance aspects of fear. Further, risk evaluation primarily was compared to
tasks of other cognitive domains serving as control conditions, thus revealing general risk
related brain activity, but not such specifically associated with estimating a higher level of
risk. We here investigated the neural basis on which lay-persons individually evaluated the
risk of different potential hazards for the society. Twenty healthy subjects underwent
functional magnetic resonance imaging while evaluating the risk of fifty more or less risky
conditions presented as written terms. Brain activations during the individual estimations
of ‘high’ against ‘low’ risk, and of negative versus neutral and positive emotional valences
were analyzed. Estimating hazards to be of high risk was associated with activation in
medial thalamus, anterior insula, caudate nucleus, cingulate cortex and further prefrontal
and temporo-occipital areas. These areas were not involved according to an analysis of the
emotion ratings. In conclusion, we emphasize a contribution of the mentioned brain areas
involved to signal high risk, here not primarily associated with the emotional valence of the
risk items. These areas have earlier been reported to be associated with, beside emotional,
viscerosensitive and implicit processing. This leads to assumptions of an intuitive
contribution, or a “gut-feeling”, not necessarily dependent of the subjective emotional
valence, when estimating a high risk of environmental hazards.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Analyzing the risk of environmental, personal and political
hazards is an everyday challenge. A proper risk assessment is
essential for survival by coping with respective threats and for
allocating necessary resources. Many, if not most decisions are
made with a certain grade of uncertainty resulting in a choice
under risk. Then, risk can consist in a disadvantageous outcome
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for the person in case of the “wrong” decision or in happiness
after the right one. Or, risk may be represented by a concrete
threat or incident which might occur or not. This has an emo-
tional impact and such risk processing was associated with
emotion processing (e.g. Bach et al., 2009; Mohr et al., 2010a).
Thereby, particularly lay persons that are not familiar with for
instance the scientific andstatistical backgroundof certain risky
conditions are prone to a more affect- or emotion-based esti-
mation when faced with the necessity of evaluating a risk or a
benefit (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2002). They then
rely stronger on previous experiences, trust, narratives ormeta-
phors than on sound knowledge (Fischhoff et al., 1982; Sjöberg,
1998), and they may use somatic signals associated with the
emotional impact (Damasio, 1996) related to a hazard as a cue
for intuitively estimating the risks: “risk as feelings” (Slovic et al.,
2004).
Recent studies provided a profound investigation and dis-
cussion on the relation of risk processing and emotions re-
garding the neurobiological backgrounds (Bach et al., 2009;
Mohr et al., 2010a; Quartz, 2009; Vorhold et al., 2007; Xu et al.,
2009). A meta-analysis assessing risk-processing related brain
regions identified a network including bilateral anterior insula,
dorsomedial and posterior thalamus, dorsomedial and right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DM/DLPFC), and right parietal
cortex to be involved (Mohr et al., 2010a). In this context, it was
argued that lay-personsmay recruit more emotion-associated
brain areas as insula, amygdala and thalamic regions during
risk processing (Anderson et al., 2003; Craig, 2002; Critchley
et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2009; Vorhold et al., 2007).
The studies in this field particularly aimed at elucidating
the neurobiological basis of risk assessment by means of
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) using condi-
tions with a subject-related risk implemented in the experi-
mental tasks. Presented stimuli or terms had to be assessed in
relation to a personal risk for the subject, or decision making
was investigated under risky conditions with reward or loss
for the subject (overview in Mohr et al., 2010a, e.g. Bach et al.,
2009; Christopoulos et al., 2009; Huettel, 2006; Preuschoff et al.,
2006; Quartz, 2009; Smith et al., 2009; Vorhold et al., 2007; Xu
et al., 2009, and others). This meant also a direct emotional
impact of the risk-related stimulus to the subjects: a possibly
immediate negative consequence as fear or enjoying a posi-
tive outcome. Further, related studies primarily investigated
risk evaluation versus control conditions that did not contain
a risk evaluation component. Such, activity associated with
estimating specifically the grade of for instance a high level of
risk was not investigated. Accordingly, it appears valuable to
investigate a risk condition which does not focus on a direct
personal risk but on general risk evaluation. Therefore, sub-
jects can rate the risk of certain hazards for the society and not
for themselves. Further, in order to focus on brain activity
particularly associated with a higher degree of risk, conditions
with a higher risk can be compared with those of lower risk.
This appears more suitable to investigate activation associat-
ed with gradually increasing risk than comparing with a non-
risk control condition.
Our aim was to use such a methodological approach in
order to assess the neurobiological backgrounds of risk pro-
cessing. Based on the mentioned previous reports associating
risk andemotionprocessing circuits (Mohr et al., 2010a;Quartz,
2009) we hypothesized that evaluating the degree of risk for
the society of various hazards will in case of high risk recruit
brain areas involved in different aspects of emotion processing
despite addressing no imminent personal meaning. In this
context, experience-based emotional signals or markers may
be important to contribute to risk estimation. Primary areas of
interest were thus insula, thalamus, lateral and medial pre-
frontal regions and amygdala.
We used non-imminent and non-personal risk terms repre-
senting possible hazards for the society with the instruction to
assess the risk for the general (Swiss) society in order to dif-
ferentiate from a personal emotional relation as far as possible
(Slovic et al., 2004). For instance, a condition as “skiing”might be
associated with positive emotions for the individual, but might
represent a certain risk for the society (or not) due to a high
accident rate. Further, we focused on the evaluative aspect and
less on the decision making or choice process by analyzing the
evaluation period prior rating feedback. Our approach is in line
with the risk perception literature, in which people's risk
perception is similar measured as in our study, in order to find
out why societies are concerned about some hazards, but not
other hazards (Slovic, 1987). Thereby, the subjects did not have
to decide for a certain action but to indicate their risk estimation
of a presented term. In this context, and differing from previous
studies contrasting general risk evaluation with non-risk
control conditions, we analyzed brain activation specifically
associated with high versus low risk. Further, we also discrim-
inated activity in the earlier phases of risk evaluation in order to
detect brain regionswith amore phasic or initial contribution to
the evaluation process. Finally, the results were exploratorily
comparedwith individual emotion ratings of the same hazards.
2. Results
2.1. Behavioral data
Twenty subjects were scanned of which 18 subjects were
included into the analysis. Altogether, 890 trials were pre-
sented and rated (out of 900 trials=50 trials per subject, 10
trials were not presented in one subject due to technical
reasons). The subjects attributed low risk to on average 16.9
terms (SD 7.2), medium risk to 18.8 terms (SD 6.8) and high risk
to 13.7 terms (SD 7.1), resulting in overall n=305 trials with low
risk, medium risk in n=338 trials and high risk in n=247 trials.
The correlation of the individual risk and emotion ratings
revealed in 8 of 50 terms a significant correlation. In 42 terms
we found no correlation between individual rating of emo-
tional valence and rating of the risk for the society. The mean
rating data for risk and emotional valence are presented in the
Supplementary Table S1.
2.2. fMRI results
Comparing the conditions ‘high risk’- and ‘low risk’-evalua-
tion for the whole presentation period of 5940 ms with a
random effects analysis, we found a stronger activation in the
‘high risk’ condition in left anterior insula, medial thalamus,
left head of the caudate nucleus, the posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC) and the precuneus (Fig. 2, Table 1).
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In the deconvolution analysis, the early phase of the
evaluating period during the first volume revealed activation
in bilateral medial thalamus and in posterior higher percep-
tion processing regions such as bilateral temporo-occipital
junction and precuneus on an exploratory significance level of
p<0.005.When considering the first two volumes together, we
found additional activation on a level p<0.001 in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), right anterior insula, caudate nuclei,
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and right dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (DLPFC; Fig. 3, Table 2). Results of the medium
risk terms were assessed exploratorily and are provided des-
criptively with the time courses in the figures, showing a
signal change ranging between the activations associatedwith
low and high risk evaluation.
Whencomparing theactivationsassociatedwith those terms
individually rated to be of negative versus positive, or negative
versus neutral emotional valence, we observed no stronger acti-
vation related to the negative valence on the level p<0.001
(random effects). Particularly, we found no activity related to
negative affect in those regions identified to be associated with
high risk also on an exploratory level of p<0.01 (randomeffects).
3. Discussion
Our aim was to investigate neural correlates associated with
estimating a high risk of environmental and technological
hazards for thesociety.We founddistinct brainregions involved,
comprising prefrontal, insular, and posterior cortical regions, as
well as medial thalamus and caudate head. These results are
discussed in the context of emotional and intuitive processing.
3.1. Anatomical and functional features of the brain
regions involved in risk-evaluation
Estimatingdistincthazards tobeofhigh riskwasassociatedwith
medial thalamic and anterior insular activation. Anatomically,
medial thalamic regions receive input fromviscerosensitive and
pain mediating brainstem areas such as the parabrachial nu-
cleus, the subnucleus reticularis, and the periaqueductal gray
(Craig, 2002; Vogt, 2005). They are considered to form a relay
within theviscerosensitivepathway towardsparticularly insular
regions, ACC and amygdala (Augustine, 1996; Craig, 2002; Vogt,
2005). The insula is involved in the processing of multimodal
visceral, sensoryandemotional stimuli (Calder, 2003;Craig, 2002;
Critchley et al., 2004; Damasio et al., 2000; Paulus and Stein, 2006;
Singeret al., 2009). Insular regionshaveawide rangeof reciprocal
connections to prefrontal areas, ACC, medial thalamus, amyg-
dala, hypothalamus, and brainstem regions as the parabrachial
nucleus for relaying visceral afferents (Augustine, 1996). It was
proposed that the interoceptive sensation of bodily signals
depends on input from the viscera represented in the anterior
insula (Critchley et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2009). In the context of
risk processing, thalamic and insular contributions were
reported during intertemporal choices involving losses which
were associated with accompanying negative emotions (Xu
et al., 2009). Thalamus and insulawere also found to be involved
in risky decisions and in anticipating risk (Huettel, 2006; Mohr et
al., 2010a, 2010b).Wehereproposemedial thalamusandanterior
insula to be involved in the mediation of bodily interoceptive
signals for evaluation purposes in response to the faced hazard.
We also found left caudate head activation associated with
high risk, particularly in the initial phase of the evaluation
Table 1 – High risk versus low risk in thewhole evaluation
period.
Peak
X
Peak
Y
Peak
Z
Cluster
size mm3
t-max
Ant. insula L
(Fig. 3A)
36 17 −5 116 4.6
Med. thalamus 3 −7 −2 172 4.7
Posterior cingulate
cortex L
−6 −34 28 403 5.0
Caudate L (Fig. 3B) −6 11 10 264 4.5
Precuneus −6 −73 31 122 4.7
Contrast ‘high risk versus low risk’ during the complete period of
risk evaluation (random effects analysis p<0.001). Abbreviations:
ant anterior, L left, med medial.
Table 2 – High risk versus low risk in deconvolution
analyses of divided evaluation period.
Peak
X
Peak
Y
Peak
Z
Cluster
size mm3
t-max
a.) First volume
Med. thalamus R 12 −7 −2 157 3.0
Med. thalamus L −9 −10 1 227 3.2
Temporo-occipital
cortex R
45 −67 16 928 3.3
Temporo-occipital
cortex L
−42 −70 19 1503 3.6
Precuneus L −9 −70 34 415 3.4
Inferior temporal
gyrus L
−54 −40 −12 256 3.5
b.) First two volumes
Ant. insula R (Fig. 2A) 36 14 −8 355 4.3
Med./ant. thalamus blt
(Fig. 2B)
−6 −7 1 1631 4.2
Head of caudate
nucleus L
−12 11 13 244 3.9
Precallosal cingulate
cortex (Fig. 2C)
6 32 16 268 3.6
Ant. cingulate cortex L −9 23 28 142 3.7
Dorsolateral PFC L
(Fig. 2D)
−33 −1 49 1712 4.2
Dorsolateral PFC R 45 −4 43 287 3.9
Med. PFC L −6 2 58 685 3.8
Posterior cingulate
cortex
0 −40 28 546 3.6
Temporo-occipital
cortex L (Fig. 2E)
−39 −70 22 2235 4.2
Temporo-occipital
cortex R
45 −70 25 981 4.1
Precuneus L −9 −70 34 1527 4.7
Inferior temporal
gyrus L
−51 −37 −15 306 4.3
Activated regions during a.) the first (p<0.005) and b.) the first two
volumes (p<0.001) of the evaluation and presentation period,
comparing ‘high risk versus low risk’ by applying a deconvolution
analysis. Abbreviations: R right, L left, blt bilateral, Med medial, inf
inferior, ant anterior, cap caput, ncl nucleus, caud caudatus, ACC
anterior cingulate cortex, PFC prefrontal cortex.
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period. The caudate head shares prominent connectivity with
the DLPFC through a series of parallel loops that project from
the cortex to the input and output nuclei of the basal ganglia,
then to the ventral–anterior and dorso-medial nuclei of the
thalamus, and then back to the cortex (Alexander et al., 1986;
Middleton and Strick, 2002). The caudate, particularly its head,
has been proposed to be sensitive to implicit executive
processing (Melrose et al., 2007; Seger and Cincotta, 2005),
and being involved in intuition and implicit learning (Lieber-
man, 2000). Functional imaging studies link activity in the
head of the caudate with information integration (Seger and
Cincotta, 2002) and with executive functions related to pro-
babilistic classification (Poldrack et al., 1999). A recent study
reported the caudate nucleus to be involved in a task assessing
risk-averse attitudes (Engelmann and Tamir, 2009). Taken
together, the caudate in the context of risk estimation may
function as a relay between cortical evaluation and thalamic
signaling contributing to classification of the presented terms
and to selection of implicit behavioral coping strategies.
The ACC, also activated during the ‘high-risk’ condition, is
involved in conflict monitoring with potential affective con-
sequences comparing the actual state with a desired state
(Carter et al., 2000; Vogt, 2005). Being confrontedwith a high risk
conditionmeans a discrepancy to the desired state, resulting in
a conflict signal. Cingulate regions are known to mediate inte-
grationand evaluation of emotional,motivational and cognitive
information, and to modulate attention (Bishop et al., 2004;
Vogt, 2005) with direct connections to amygdala, thalamus,
prefrontal and insular areas and to the posterior parietal lobe
(Goldman-Rakic, 1988). Cingulate activity in risk tasks was
associated with a higher probability of a risky choice (Christo-
poulos et al., 2009) and was increased when risky choices
involved immediate losses (Xuet al., 2009).Activationwithin the
PCC was suggested to signal the subjective preferences that
guide visual orienting within a gambling task comprising risky
choices (McCoy and Platt, 2005). ACC and PCC were reported to
be involved throughout all phases of risky decision making in a
task concerning financial aspects (Engelmann and Tamir, 2009;
Shackman et al., 2011).
We also found activation in medial and dorsolateral PFC
when estimating high risk. This indicates an association with
internal control and executive functions (Miller and Cohen,
2001; Wood and Grafman, 2003) which are regularly present in
studies assessing cognitive and emotional functions (Pessoa,
2008). The contribution of these areas lead to argue that com-
ponents of an analytical system are also involved in risk
processing in lay people, or that executive strategies may be
primedor selected for instance in theDLPFC (Mohr et al., 2010a).
This can be accounted also to the specific instruction to rate the
hazards regarding the risk for the society which may favor
analytic processes apart emotional or intuitive components.
Posterior cortical activations associated with high risk
occurred in temporo-occipital cortex regions and in the pre-
cuneus. The temporo-occipital junctional cortex, covering
sensory associative cortices, is involved in multisensory inte-
grationof information (Beauchamp, 2005),which is increased by
attention-requiring processes and efforts of performance
(Mesulam, 1998), and in theory of mind (Lee and Siegle, 2009).
The activation in the current study, found already in the very
early evaluation period, may indicate an attentional bias
towards risk-related terms, which also has been shown in the
context of anxiety (Lee and Telch, 2008). The precuneus was
reported to be involved in episodic memory retrieval and self-
related processing (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006), which are also
relevant during risk estimation.
Regarding the explorative deconvolution analysis and des-
criptively the time courses, we found anterior insula, medial
thalamus and anterior cingulate to be active in the earlier
periods of risk evaluation. This implies a role of a quicker and
more phasic signaling in the context of detecting or estimating
a high risk.
Taking together the brain activations and their functional
implications, one might suggest pathways of risk processing.
These include temporo-occipital areas for initial stimulus
analysis with respect to the impact for the subject and others.
They further comprise an intuitive estimation involving vis-
cerosensitive areas as medial thalamus and insula, with a
supposed bottom-up link towards prefrontal areas via the
caudate for possibly selecting implicit strategies. This finally
leads to evaluation and decision making involving prefrontal
areas, based on a nominal value comparison regarding the
impact for the person involving cingulate regions.
3.2. Intuitive risk estimation and “gut”-feelings
Risk evaluation by lay persons has been considered to be
based on emotional signals, expressed as “risk as feelings”
(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2004), and to involve an
affect-based experiential rather than an analytical system
(Slovic et al., 2004; Vorhold et al., 2007). For instance, implicit
measures may reveal negative attitudes towards for instance
nuclear power that were not detected by explicit measures
(Siegrist et al., 2006). The experiential system may be more
important than the analytic system when lay people assess
technological risks compared to technical experts.
Our data enhance and differentiate this view by supporting
the contribution of a viscerosensitive component to the esti-
mation of high risk. Earlier reports addressing risk evaluation
emphasized the emotional components as reflected by for
instance amygdala, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC),
and insular activation (Fukui et al., 2005; Huettel, 2006; Mohr
et al., 2010a; Quartz, 2009; Vorhold et al., 2007; Weller et al.,
2007; Xu et al., 2009). These regions may be involved in risk
evaluation in general, independent of the degree of risk. This
mayexplainon theonehand that these regionswerenot found
to be differentially activated here when contrasting high ver-
sus low risk, and on the other hand the finding of areas spe-
cifically associated with high risk that were not identified in
previous studies.
A discriminative viewof emotional and evaluative aspects of
risk assessment is supported by our finding that themajority of
our terms, 42 out of 50, had no correlation between risk esti-
mation and emotional valence. Further, analyzing the function-
al data based on the individually rated emotional valence of the
potentialhazardsdidnot showanybrain regions tobeactivated.
This has, of course, to be regarded as exploratorily, also because
the emotional arousal contributing to emotion related brain
activation was not directly assessed, but it at least implies that
risk evaluation and emotional evaluation may not be coupled
tightly.
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Within this context, we revealed a contribution of areas
representing associations with implicit and viscerosensitive
functions as caudate, medial thalamus and insula. This lends
support to the assumption of an evaluation concerning the
risk of hazards by lay-persons based on intuitive processes
and bodily signals. These are linked to emotions and may
support affective processing, however, they may form an own
functional entity.
Regarding proposed systems for decision making in the
context of risk analysis, the analytical and the experiential
system (Slovic et al., 2004), viscerosensitive signals are
suggested to serve the experiential one. This is used when
lay persons have to base their decision more on experiences,
whichare biasedmoreby emotional influences, thanon logical
and analytical considerations or on scientific facts (Finucane
et al., 2000). From a phylogenetic perspective, an evaluation
system based on experiences and non-analytical estimations
makes sense and is important in beings without highest
rational capacities, and for quick response in case of danger. In
human, these evaluation systems are accordingly used in
conditions without sufficient knowledge for analytical ap-
proaches, thus when intuition is required (Lieberman, 2000;
Volz and von Cramon, 2006). In such evaluation and decision
contexts,weoften rely onsignals that are commonly termedas
“gut”-feelings.
3.3. Conclusion
We emphasize a contribution of particularly insular, thalamic
andcaudate regions to be involved in signalinghigh risk,which
here was not associated with the emotional valence of the risk
items. These areas have earlier been reported to be associated
with, beside emotional, viscerosensitive and implicit proces-
sing. This implies assumptions of an intuitive contribution, or
a “gut-feeling”, not necessarily dependent of the subjective
emotional valence, when estimating a high risk of hazards for
the society. In risk communication, this affective foundation,
based on “gut”-feelings, of lay people's assessment of hazards
may be taken in to account.
4. Experimental procedures
4.1. Subjects
Twenty healthy subjects (age 22–29 years, mean 25.1, all right
handed, 11 females) were recruited to participate in this study
and gave written informed consent. The study was approved
by the local ethics committee. Two subjects were excluded
afterwards because of movement artifacts (exceeding 3 mm in
one direction), such that data of 18 subjects were analyzed.
The subjects were healthy without any psychiatric or neuro-
logic history and did not take any psychotropic medication.
4.2. Experimental design
During fMRI scanning, the subjects evaluated the general risk of
different hazards such as “nuclear power”, “smoking”, “bicy-
cling” etc. for the society (complete list originally in German,
English translation in Supplementary material). A related
paradigm has earlier been used for examining the research
question of why lay people perceive different hazards differ-
ently (Siegrist et al., 2005; Slovic, 1987), and was adapted for the
current study comprising common potential hazards. The
subjects were presented written terms for 5940 ms (equivalent
to 3 repetition times, TR, for the fMRI volumes). In this period,
they were instructed to judge the risk of the respective hazard
for the local, i.e. Swiss, society. So, this period comprised the
processes of perceiving, evaluating and judging/estimating of
the hazards (“evaluating period”). Subsequently, a five-step
visual analog scalewas presented for 3960 ms (two volumes) on
which the subjects indicated the individually estimated risk
from very low to very high by moving a cursor using a trackball
with the right hand (Fig. 1), the “rating period”. Altogether, 50
stimuli (terms) were presented in a randomized order. The
following baseline period (13,700 ms, 7 TR) was of sufficient
duration to allow the blood oxygen level-dependent signal to
wear off before the next trial. The task was programmed with
Presentation™, Neurobehavioral Systems, USA. The termswere
presented in black letters on a white background via digital
video goggles (Resonance Technologies, Northridge, CA) in a
size approximately equivalent to font size 24 in the focus of a
laptop screen in reading distance such that minimal eye
movements were required to read the terms. After scanning,
the subjectswere asked to rate the subjective emotional valence
of the risk terms on a nine-step visual analog scale (very
negative = 1, neutral = 5, very positive = 9).
4.3. Data acquisition
Imaging was performed with a 3.0 T GE Signa™ HD Scanner
(GE Medical Systems, Milwaukee). Echoplanar imaging was
performed for fMRI (repetition time TR/echo time TE
1,980 ms/32 ms, 22 sequential axial slices, whole brain, slice
thickness 3.5 mm, 1 mm gap, resulting voxel size 3.125×
3.125×4.5 mm, matrix 64×64 pixels, field of view 200 mm,
flip angle 70°). 611 volumes were obtained per subject, 12 per
trial. Four initial volumes were discarded to allow for T2
equilibration effects, seven volumes were added for a final
baseline. High-resolution 3-D T1 weighted anatomical vol-
umes were acquired (TR/TE 9.9/2.9 ms; matrix size 256×256;
1 mm×1 mm×1 mm resolution) for coregistration with the
functional data.
handgun
low high
RISK +Word 5940 ms
Scale 3960 ms
Base total 15840 ms
Fig. 1 – Experimental task. Trials started with a term
presentation of near 6 s with the task to evaluate the risk of
the term for the society. This was followed by a feedback
period of near 4 s. A baseline condition of near 16 s was
implemented between the trials.
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4.4. Data analysis
fMRI data were analyzed using BrainVoyager™ QX 1.10.1
(Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands). Preproces-
sing of the functional scans included motion correction, slice
scan time correction, high frequency temporal filtering, and
removal of linear trends. Functional images were super-
imposed on the 2D anatomical images and incorporated into
3D data sets. The individual 3D data sets were transformed
into Talairach space resulting in a voxel size of 3 mm×3mm×
3 mm and then spatially smoothed with an 8 mm Gaussian
kernel for subsequent group analysis. From each included
subject (n=18), the individual ratings of each term were
analyzed concerning risk value and divided in three groups:
low risk, medium risk, high risk. Low risk was defined as
ratings between 1.00 and 2.00, medium risk between 2.01 and
3.40 and high risk between 3.41 and 5.00 based on the
distribution of the evaluation ratings (consider Supplementa-
ry material Figure S2). Individual protocols for each subject for
the fMRI-analysis were built comprising the individually rated
items meeting the three conditions low, medium, high risk
and the respective three presentation conditions of the rating
scale as predictors resulting in each six predictors for the
design matrix. The periods were modeled as epochs using a
two-gamma hemodynamic response function provided by
BrainVoyager™ adapted to the applied period duration.
The fMRI data analysis, based on the general linear model
(GLM), comprised the following steps: First, fixed effects
analyses were calculated separately for each subject for the
contrast comparing the individual conditions ‘high risk’ versus
‘low risk’ resulting in summary images. The summary images
were subjected to second level groupanalyses. Thus, those trials
in which the terms were rated with ‘high’ and ‘low’ risk were
considered, irrespective of theword contents. For analyzing the
whole evaluation period, three-dimensional statistical para-
metric maps were calculated for the groups using a random
effects analysis. The main analysis focused on the contrast
“high risk>low risk”. The voxel-wise threshold for reporting
results in the random effects analysis was set at p<0.001. To
correct formultiple comparisons, aMonte Carlo simulationwas
used (Goebel et al., 2006) for estimating cluster-level false-
positive rates on these maps, yielding after 10.000 iterations a
minimum cluster size threshold of 4 voxels of 3×3×3 mm
(108mm3), corresponding to a corrected cluster level p<0.04.
As the evaluating period comprised early perceptual and
rapid judgmental as well as later explicitly estimative and
perhaps already preparatory processes we were further inter-
ested in brain activity particularly in the earlier periods of risk
evaluation with an exploratory approach. When of course
overlapping with the analysis covering the whole period, this
analysis revealed regionsparticularly active in the initial phase
of evaluation, of which the associated activation may be
mitigated when analyzing the whole period. This appeared
important for us, as risk evaluationmay be regarded as a chain
of process comprising initial perception of the stimulus, quick
intuitive/emotional estimation, rational consideration and a
final decision. Therefore, we applied a deconvolution analysis
(Dale and Buckner, 1997; Pierce and Redcay, 2008) to achieve a
better temporal resolution: we defined the three volumes
acquired during the assessment period as single time points
using no specific hemodynamic response function. We anal-
yzed the brain activity within the period of the first volume
separately (approximately 2 s), and also for the first two vo-
lumes (near 4 s) of the three volumeperiod. For these analyses,
we used a statistical threshold of p<0.001, corresponding to a
correction for multiple comparisons according to the FDR
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Fig. 2 – Brain activation with color coded maps and time courses according to a random effects analysis (p<0.001) of the whole
evaluation period comparing high risk against low risk. A. insula, B. head of caudate.
83B R A I N R E S E A R C H 1 4 0 0 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 7 8 – 8 6
Author's personal copy
Ant. insula
y= 14
R
0
0.5  % signal change
Med. thalamus
y= -8
R
ACC 
y= 32
R
0
0.5  % signal change
0
0.5  % signal change
A
B
C
High risk
Medium risk
Low risk
Term  Scale
DLPFC 
y= 0
R
LTOC 
y= -68
R
0
0.5  % signal change
0
0.5  % signal change
D
E
Fig. 3 – Brain activation including time courses according to the deconvolution analyses (p<0.001) of the first 4 s of risk evaluation
high vs. low risk, here A. anterior insula, B. medial thalamus regions, C. anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), D. dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC), and E. lateral temporo-occipital cortex (LTOC).
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corrected p<0.05, together with a cluster threshold of
108 mm3, and also analyzed exploratorily with a threshold of
p<0.005 (uncorrected). By using this approach, those areas
were identified where the activation significantly differed
between the conditions ‘high risk’ and ‘low risk’ during the
period of the first volume and during the first two volumes
together.
Based on the emotion ratings, we performed an analysis of
brain activity during the presentation/evaluation period of
those terms rated individually to be associated with negative
affect comparedwith those rated positive or neutral. Analog to
the risk analysis, the thresholdwas set to p<0.001 in a random
effects analysis. Exploratorily, we assessed activity also at
p<0.01. Finally, the emotion ratings were compared by using
Pearson's correlation with the risk ratings during the exper-
iment in the scanner.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2011.05.023.
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